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ABSTRACT 
 
As Corporate Reputation (CR) evolves into an important asset for organizations, crises, disasters 
and other supply chain disruptive events, stand as threats to the preservation of the reputation 
capital since they usually result to negative projections to their audiences and to problematic 
evaluations by their stakeholders. Viewing CR as the accumulated trust and positive evaluations 
of the stakeholders, this paper proposes a conceptual and normative framework for Reputation 
Continuity, which enhances the ability of organizations to preserve their reputation, instead of 
working for its recovery in the post-crisis period. In our approach, we propose a process of 
maintaining trusted links, instead of restoring them and establishing a reputation resilient 
organization, instead of one struggling to recover from reputation losses, after the crisis has 
emerged.  Working closely with stakeholders during the crisis, injecting a sense of normality 
continuity through effective leadership and mitigating image problems are seen as critical 
concerns, alongside a set of managerial practices to be followed. Ultimately, it is argued that, the 
value-based and strategically integrated view of Business Continuity must be enhanced and 
supported by Reputation Continuity activities. 
 
Keywords:  Business Ethics; Reputation Continuity; Corporate Reputation; Organizational Crises; Supply Chain 
Crises; Crisis Communications; Business Continuity 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n the light of the fundamental work of Fombrun & Shanley (1990) and later analyses, the field of 
Corporate Reputation (CR) has been growing, thus enriching our knowledge with studies as to what 
constitutes Corporate Reputation (Dowling, 2001), what are its contributions in organizational life, how it 
may be managed (Whetten, 1997), measured (Simerly, 1999) and sustained (Roberts & Dowling, 2002). As Wartick 
(2002) suggests, corporate reputation leads to increased marketing shares, operational resilience and effective human 
talent attraction, thus initiating a number of positive effects across the whole spectrum of organizational activities.  
 
Given the fragile nature and complexity of the reputation concept, theorists have been concerned with the 
impact of crises and disasters on corporate reputation (Zyglidopoulos, 2001) and a stream of studies has been 
analyzing reputation risk, namely the risk that a latent reputation problem will evolve into an actual one (Davies, 
2002; Regan, 2008). The problem with corporate reputation is that it is solely based on the perceptions and 
evaluations of the stakeholders that are flux, situational and easy to be changed within a relatively short amount of 
time. In this respect, while financial damages and operational pitfalls may be contained and handled, audiences‟ 
perceptions and impressions cannot. Moreover, considering reputation capital as a value depending on stakeholder 
relations and interests, it becomes obvious that a crisis constitutes a disruption with potential asymmetrical results on 
reputation. These effects are further amplified by the involvement of the mass media in the crisis escalation and the 
(over) dramatization often involved serving the purpose of building agendas of fear and risk that increases audience 
headcount. 
 
I 
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In this paper, the concept of reputation continuity is introduced, the particularities of reputation crises as a 
result of a disruptive event are discussed, the effects of such a crisis are investigated and finally an approach for 
achieving reputation continuity during crises, addressed to organizations, leaders and managers, is proposed. The 
analysis sheds light in three underdeveloped areas of business continuity, under the reputation perspective, these 
being the capitalized perceptions and evaluations of stakeholders, the organizational crises as incidents of trust 
disruption and threats of unintended exposure and the potential for an immediate recovery of broken links of trust 
within a relatively short amount of time.  
 
Drawing on a case of successful implementation of reputation continuity processes, where recovery from a 
supply chain/ product recall crisis was not needed, as stakeholder perceptions were quickly mended, the argument 
for less communication and more stakeholder-based involvement in crisis management is introduced. It is argued, 
that none of the existing proposals for crisis communication strategies places emphasis on reputation continuity. To 
bridge this gap, a stakeholder-based approach is proposed, that stands against the traditional image restoration and 
recovery methodologies, in favor of a proactive continuity preservation management structure. Finally, the paper 
concludes with a brief exploration of potential contributions of Reputation Continuity to business management and 
the imminent research tasks this involves. 
 
THE RISE OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 
 
Without doubt, corporate reputation has evolved in the last decades as an important issue for organizational 
life and management theory. This does not come as a surprise, since organizations‟ needs for a global and 
competitive presence raises even more hurdles for an enterprise to overcome (Spanos et al., 2007) and given the 
transformation of the society into a global, networked system where meaning is dissolved and sense-making 
mechanisms are replacing the traditional industrial society (Castells, 1996; Giddens, 1990). Such society is 
increasingly based on image rather than substance, on mediated information rather than first hand experiences 
(Beck, 1992; Thompson, 1995) and finally on perceptions rather than assumptions (Alvesson, 1990). In this 
environment, corporate reputation has evolved from an indication of success to an absolute imperative; in the late 
modern network society, organizations are forced to adopt the rules of social responsibility and corporate citizenship 
in order to protect their reputation and remain legitimate players. 
 
These social changes have triggered a substantial amount of research efforts and theoretical structures, 
ultimately leading to the formation of new dynamism for Corporate Reputation studies. In the last two decades, a 
vast number of literature has emerged, dealing with issues of Corporate Reputation thus enriching our knowledge as 
to what reputation is (Fombrun, 1996), where it resides within and outside the organization (Deephouse & Carter, 
2005), how it is developed and sustained (Jackson, 2004) and how it affects organizational life (Roberts & Dowling, 
2002). Despite the intangibility of reputation and its complexity as a social capital resource, several analyses exist 
that are dealing with corporate reputation measurement in the form of metrical systems and measurable reputation 
factors (Cravens et al., 2006). Still, one can argue,  that practitioners still rely on traditional press analyses (e.g. 
Fortune AMAC, MediaLink Index in Greece) when it comes to corporate reputation assessment.  Moreover, 
corporate reputation has often been seen in connection with other management and social sciences such as Issue 
Management (Zyglidopoulos, 2003), Public Relations, Mass Media (Deephouse, 2000; Carroll & McCombs, 2003) 
and Performance Management. A dominant view, connecting the above approaches, is that positive reputation 
provides the organization with the ability to develop its image and brands marketing as well as to enhance and 
improve its market value (Dowling, 2006). 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CRISES AND CORPORATE REPUTATION 
 
Today, more than ever, organizations are forced to comply to societal rules and pressures as they expect to 
be legitimate and reputable. In addition, in the complex environment of late modernity, organizations, large and 
small, are challenged by corporate crises more than ever. In the light of the last decade, crisis management has 
known a period of intensive interest and academic development. The relatively vague field of organizational crises 
(Pearson & Claire, 1999) has experienced a decade where crises and natural disasters have dominated the mass 
media and been extensively analyzed. Organizations, governments and leaders are becoming more sensitive to 
theoretical and applicable development of the fields of crisis and disaster management.  
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This trend is expected to amplify as the nature of political and business organizations itself has radically 
changed in the last ten years. Palazzo & Scherer (2008) have discussed how corporations have evolved from 
business entities into citizens, namely organizations with social obligations and extensive responsibility for human 
values. Such trend widens the “ethical gap”, i.e. the distance between social expectations and corporate tactics and 
increases the possibility of crises. In other words, it is not only the observed reality of more crises but also the 
expectation that crises and disasters will increase in numbers, grow in size and extend in various secondary crises 
that makes the field of Crisis and Disaster Management so contemporary, challenging and fertile.  
 
Literature is full of examples of business crises that include amongst others, the well documented Exxon 
Valdez oil spill (Ott, 2005), the racial discrimination case at Texaco (Pruitt & Nethercutt, 2002), the incidents of 
glass, found in Gerber baby foods (Koepp, 1986), the bankruptcy of Orange County (Baldassare, 1998). In spite of 
the raising interest in crises and corporate scandals, a common definition has not been stated yet (Pearson & Claire, 
1999). According to Arpan & Pomper (2003), a crisis is an unpredictable major threat which might produce negative 
effects and harm organizational legitimacy and reputation if it is improperly handled. Shrivistava and Mitroff (1987) 
suggested different types of corporate crises, pointing out that each crisis results from organization-environment 
interactions of socio-technical factors. Quarantelli (1988) argues that there are community crises which are 
generated by natural or technological agents, e.g. “disasters” and conflict type situations such as wars, civil 
disturbance, riots etc., and non-community kind of disaster crises, such as most transportation accidents that do not 
impact the functioning of type community. In general, organizational crises are particularly interesting phenomena 
characterized by unpredictability and non-patterned recurrences and they challenge corporations‟ efficiency and 
viability.  
 
 Fewer studies have attempted to provide an understanding on the relationship between organizational crises 
and reputation performance although it is reasonably expected that the production of negative images due to a crisis 
might easily evolve into a reputation crisis. Organizational or brand crises affect, usually negatively, corporate 
reputation by producing negative cognitive association and by creating problematic images of an organization. For 
instance, the Brent Spar crisis (Heugens & Zyglidopoulos, 2007) has developed a complex discourse around Shell 
that directly harmed the corporation and its image. Crises seriously damage the ability of a social entity to formulate 
an influential voice, thus the symbolic power is reduced and its prestige is harmed (Bourdieu, 1999).  
 
 Negative effects of crises have been analyzed in case studies, revealing how crises might damage corporate 
image (Tsoukas, 1999), how they may lead to a temporary detachment of consumers (Hale, 2005) or create more 
permanent business relations‟ disruptions (O‟Rourke, 2001). Another perspective which is presented by Morley 
(1998) suggests that bad reputation leads to a crisis, thus an organizational crisis is not solely a result of mere events 
but also from the problematic image of the organization. Based on this perspective, theorists have developed 
frameworks of proactive organization action; in other words an organization may escape the harmful consequences 
of crises by developing an appropriate reputation background.  
 
  Finally, another approach consists of normative studies showing how organizations should react and protect 
their reputation in the event of a crisis. In this respect, a dominant view on the relationship between crises and 
reputation is a communication-based one, consisting of a large set of normative approaches as to how organizations 
should prevent (Regester & Larkin, 2005), handle (Fink, 1986) and recover (Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 1999) from 
crises. Corporate reputation is protected by the usage of communicative practices, which may minimize the effects 
of crises and ensure business continuity and recovery. In this respect the approaches of image restoration (Benoit, 
1995) or organizational apologia (Rowland & Jerome, 2004; Hearit, 2001) are examples of organizational rhetoric 
strategies and communication-based techniques, which aim at distancing the organizational reality from the crisis 
and convince the public that the organization still deserves its respect.  A critical evaluation of current literature, as 
presented in this section, reveals an annoying reality. While, everybody agree that corporate reputation is a 
significant and fragile asset and that organizational crises are directly associated with its deterioration, the normative 
approaches are mainly focused on the recovery of reputation capital and the restoration of the organization‟s image 
across the stakeholders, after the crisis has occurred and the corporate image has been substantially hurt. An analogy 
with the crisis management landscape would require us to see this as a situation where organizations allow the 
unfolding of events and consequences before taking corrective and recovery action. The lacking of an approach for 
reputation proactive protection is explained by the inability of organizational systems to handle a vast number of 
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variant external audiences and mediating agents, especially given the scarcity of information and the stress and 
pressure imposed on individuals and teams.  
 
  In this paper we introduce Reputation Continuity (RC), a term which combines two different streams of 
research, i.e. Corporate Reputation and Business Continuity. We believe that RC can substantially contribute to the 
field of Corporate Reputation Management, supporting the organizations in creating a protective shield, a safe 
cushion between organizational crises and its effects and actual corporate reputation.   In doing so, Reputation 
Continuity is seen here as the integrated ability of organizations to motivate their resources during crises and achieve 
an uninterrupted flow of trust while preserving the pre-crisis perceptions of stakeholders. In other words, and similar 
to how Business Continuity Management works, reputation continuity consists of the effort to isolate the problem 
from the actual set of consequences and ensure that it is marginalized and ultimately eliminated by the use of 
alternative resources and parallel channels, in this case channels of communication. As reputation is built within 
stakeholders groups, which observe a number of organizational action dimensions, including quality, employment, 
innovation and leadership, we argue that maintaining the links of trust with stakeholders is crucial in the struggle of 
organizations to support a flawless and untampered reputation capital. 
 
A REPORTED CASE FOR REPUTATION CONTINUITY 
 
  To investigate the concept and applicability of Reputation Continuity in a real life business environment, 
we followed the events, actions and consequences of an organization that has followed an intuitive reputation 
continuity plan when exposed to a severe product recall crisis in 2009. That year, a medium-sized pharmaceutical 
firm in Germany, offering contract manufacturing services to a wide range of customers and prestigious 
pharmaceutical corporations, has been forced to accept that 92 batches of an oncology product, manufactured and 
checked for quality by the firm, have been found as non-compliant with regulations and needed to be recalled from 
the market. The affected customer, a large pharmaceutical company, has immediately taken action to confront the 
supply chain crisis and coordinate the product recall; however the case was reported in the business media and 
information was spilled in the business sector. As a research team, working on a Corporate Identity project at that 
time, we received permission to document the events, conduct interviews and revisit the incident through 
„confession sessions‟; our study was finalized within a period of five (5) months and included the analysis of 
nineteen (19) interviews and a detailed log of events through direct observation.  
 
  Product recalls are a typical form of crisis that creates frustration to affected customers, communities (in 
this case doctors and transitionally their customers) as well as supply chain partners and sub-contractors, not least 
employees and managers.  Typically, negative exposure results to increased levels of insecurity, decreasing trust and 
increased risk perceptions as organizational audiences develop the feeling that the incident is to be repeated (Elliot et 
al., 2011). As part of a spillover effect, stakeholders often tend to lower their evaluations for organizations, not only 
in terms of product and service quality but also in relation to employment practices, strategic focus and future 
growth. Typically organizations would suffer from reputation losses and work in the post-crisis period to confirm 
their identity by advertising, public relations efforts and an apologia approach (Hearritt, 2008). 
 
  However, the examined case differs from others in that the organization was immediately involved in an 
informal reputation continuity process, by developing a wide number of channels of communication with 
stakeholders; while crisis communication management typically favors centralization of communication and 
appreciates the role of the spokesman, the CEO of the firm asked middle managers to be engaged in an unstructured 
and open-ended stakeholder campaign. His words, reported in two interviews, were exactly these: 
 
Go out and tell them that we are just fine and they are also just fine 
 
The result of this management mandate was the organization of fifty nine face to face meetings or teleconferences 
within the next six days, involving twelve middle managers and two members of the top management team with 
customers, suppliers, the media and regulatory agencies in Germany and the UK. Surprisingly, informal networks 
also became part of this process. For instance, a quality control chemist who happened to meet a medical 
representative in a previous training scheme called him and explained the situation:  
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It seems natural, at that time, to call everybody and mention to them that we were at fault, but who isn’t, at some 
point, in this complex industry? 
 
  Quoting the Head of Operations‟ words: 
 
Time was important. Our CEO has given us the impression that we should go into people’s heads before the crisis 
does… it was like a race and we all believed in this. Even people handling the recall with the customer started 
sending emails, to feed us with information. 
 
  A week after the crisis resolution (Day 11 after the event) the organization decided to conduct an additional 
quick reputation audit, including all stakeholders, and personnel. A 378 people survey in eight (8) stakeholder 
groups revealed steady reputation performance with a slight decrease in the expected performance in the next five 
years (-4%). For analyzing this case, from a reputation continuity perspective, we have then conducted the 
interviews with people in the organization and three (3) industry experts. The interviews debriefing and our analysis 
on existing business practices, resulted in the identification of four main activities, constituting the reputation 
continuity process.  
 
  First, the immediate reaction and opening of a wide number of communication channels fueled the 
reputation engine and lead to an unexpected, yet welcomed, cycle of positive reactions. Second, the engagement of 
people and their participation in an instrumental, yet informal, stakeholder plan lead to the development of stronger 
identities, which indirectly and mostly subconsciously, supported the projected image of the organization (as it 
happened in meetings and calls). Rather than normalizing the unexpected or presenting the case as “business as 
usual”, it was by overcoming the formal communication barriers that people projected the organizational strong 
values, empowered beliefs and state of the art policies. Third, stakeholders were reminded of the good company 
record and the positive results until the recall announcement, thus they were driven to contextualize and frame the 
crisis as a unique event, an exception to the rule, an unfortunate incident not likely to be ever repeated. The critical 
problem of visibility, namely the audiences‟ and the media‟s tendency to focus on the present has been avoided as 
the events were placed within a wider, tough to comply, risk environment. The incident was normalized, although 
not covered. This is precisely the fourth reputation continuity activity, i.e. the observed and reported ability of the 
organization to project a “nothing to hide” culture, thus minimizing risk perceptions or suspected systemic 
deficiencies. Finally, by researching the short-term reputation effects, we deduced that a reputation continuity plan is 
heavily related with the memory of individual assessors. As one interviewed expert said:  
 
In my mind, I was able to forget the event and was reminded of the recall during the survey [reputation audit] 
period. Even then, my feeling was that the company was able to stay on top of the image game 
 
 However, secondary-results have been noticed. Dutton et al., (1994) have argued that the construed image, 
namely the perception of insiders of organizations as to how they are evaluated by outsiders critically influences the 
ability of an organization to survive and prosper. At this point, one proposition is that the effort of the organization 
to ensure its reputation continuity re-enforced the morale and commitment of organizational members as 
reputational survival leads to the continuity of aspects of the social capital. In previous studies, social capital at 
certain instances facilitates and efficiently supports responses to accidents and disruptions. Moreover, the ability of 
the organization to be engaged in a reputation continuity plan has replaced the noticeable reluctance of organizations 
to be engaged in intra-organizational collaboration while also leading to the development of emerging teams and a 
„healthy‟ debate in the organization. To some extent, the ability of the leader of the organization to transform the 
continuity and survival issue from a viability concern into a positive goal, triggered, inspired if you like, an 
automatic positive collective spirit within the organization. In this respect, we identify the three levels of reputation 
continuity including leadership motivation, low level channeled communication and continuity identity and culture 
creation, as having fundamental value for the organization. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
From the theoretical background and the case analysis presented in the previous sections, some interesting 
conclusions emerge. First, we argue that a consistent, reputation-driven and during crisis effort to support the pre-
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existing perceptions may lead to reputational sustainability and continuity. Reputation Continuity requires the active 
engagement of leadership in transferring a vision of recovery and act as a source of motivation while also building a 
strong emerging recovery identity across the spectrum of organization‟s departments, teams and operations. Then, 
this continuity identity and the normalization of the crisis need to be channeled to stakeholders through specialized 
and dedicated information channels. Finally, organizations need to measure their reputation performance in order to 
be aware of changes in audiences‟ perceptions and evaluations.  
 
Still, one could justly wonder whether Reputation Continuity Management is just another term, added to a 
number of management fashions and concepts. In this paper, it is mainly argued that while operational continuity 
and image restoration have been seen as two exclusive tasks, often understood as in linear sequence, it is part of the 
immediate organizational tasks to work closely with the stakeholders in order to ensure that trust links are not lost 
and reputation is sustained. This approach requires from organizations three changes in the way crises are handled. 
First, they are required to embed reputation actions and consequences as part of their operational crisis handling 
procedures and not neglect the stakeholders. Second, they must abandon a dedicated and exclusive communication-
based perspective in favor of a more profound collaboration with their stakeholders and their audiences. Finally, 
organizations need to be able to monitor their reputation capital, mainly through intensive surveying in order to 
make sure that they are aware of reputation damages as soon as they emerge. As it was shown in the reported case, 
the strategic view of reputation as a value which needs to be sustained and protected in times of crises kept the 
company away from the approach of „image restoration‟ and post-crisis image recovery while empowering an active 
and ongoing reputation continuity approach.  
 
An observed practice of this study, one that sees corporate crisis communications as an open, shared and 
collective process is also a topic for discussion. In most crisis communications frameworks, the proposed models 
require a high degree of centralization, information control and a tight strategic set of boundaries. While those 
principles are obviously validated in practice, our case reveals that a more flux, de-centralized, human-based and 
relatively unstructured communication process may lead to good results, particularly when outsiders consider the 
organization as being in a „non-crisis‟ situation as normal communication continues.  
 
It is also arguable that a reputation continuity approach produces interesting results for the overall task of 
business continuity. As Elliott et al., (2009) argue, business continuity escapes the limits of hardware and 
operational recovery and may be seen as a mindset and a value-based set of capabilities. It is precisely how 
reputation continuity may reinforce these mindsets, inject individuals with trust and act as a survival resource. Also, 
we argue here that the opening of stakeholder communication and reputation preservation may facilitate the work of 
business continuity and emergencies‟ handling, in the sense that emerging networks of collaboration can potentially 
assist the operational resolution of issues. As presented in our business case, it was due to preserving the reputation 
capital that the organization was able to work effectively and without a hidden agenda for the immediate and 
effective recall of products and the analysis of the problem.  Finally, it is always useful to mention a number of 
arguments that could be made against the introduced reputation continuity concept, so a fertile cycle of academic 
discourse can be triggered. The concept seems fragile, given the fluid nature of the term and the relatively difficult 
task to measure corporate reputation, especially as events unfold. However, reputation capital measurement schemes 
have been proposed, as presented in literature, while rankings and evaluation studies may be used in order to 
indicate a decrease or increase of the reputation standings of organizations. In this respect, reputation continuity may 
be addressed as the minimization or elimination of reputation effects propagated by negative incidents, accidents 
and crises. It is also arguable that a strong engagement with stakeholders during crisis may amplify risks of 
information leaks, further litigation of undesired reactions from affected stakeholders. In the case that a strong 
reputation has not been capitalized, stakeholder channeling may be seen as paradoxical and contradictory, if not 
designed to change perceptions. 
 
However, in spite of these restrictions, and many others, we strongly suggest, that reputation continuity is a 
positive approach and should be embedded in the immediate reactive processes of organizations as they should seek 
to preserve their image and reputation rather than restore it. The capital, effort and time required to rebuild a 
reputation are substantially higher once a crisis has been framed as problematic and stakeholders‟ memories have 
been affected by the incidents. 
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